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Abstract
In the globalised world, international borders ought to be mere lines on the map. But recent
studies have shown that informal trade barriers still exist, and inhibit trade, particularly so in the
developing countries. This can arise due to a host of factors such as complex customs procedures,
which sometimes change, and capacity constraints, given limited facilities and/or corruption at the
border. However, non-tariff barriers of various sorts and structural impediments are less obvious and
perhaps more interesting, but also much more difficult to measure directly. In this context, this paper
attempts to quantify the relevant costs resulting from informal barriers that impinge upon trade
between India and Bangladesh through the land customs stations (LCSs) at Petrapole (West Bengal)
and Benapole (Bangladesh). The study is based on primary data collated through surveys conducted in
West Bengal.
Our estimates show that the aggregate delay pertaining to all the phases of exports turns out
to be approximately four days for a single shipment. It also shows that the additional transaction costs
in terms of delays and speed money incurred by the Indian exporters during trading with Bangladesh is
about 10 per cent of shipment value. The present study has shown that informal barriers/para-tariff in
India-Bangladesh trade are already high and further trade liberalisation without improving the
infrastructure would be counterproductive. The paper ends with feasible policy recommendations to
make trade between India and Bangladesh more vibrant.
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Quantifying Transport, Regulatory and Other
Costs of India-Bangladesh Trade
1.  Introduction
Globalisation has opened up opportunities to developing countries in the form of outflows of
value-added services and low-cost raw materials/human resource skills, improved market access for
their exports, efficiency gains in economies through technology transfers, and  spill-over resource
allocations. Increasingly, the developing countries have begun to position themselves to participate in
regional and global markets. This, in turn, depends on efficient transport and trade facilitation systems.
Costs related to trade facilitation have long been thought to be an important factor determining
transaction costs, in addition to other factors such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Of late, tariffs and
non-tariff barriers have been losing their significance because of successive rounds of negotiations
under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). On the other hand, transportation costs have plateaued
because of technological innovations. As a result, trade facilitation or border delays have become much
more conspicuous and deserve greater attention than they had received in the past. However, few
studies have focused attention on informal trade barriers such as border delays on account of capacity
constraints, customs clearances, and corruption. As Hummels (2001) asserts, “[N]on-tariff barriers of
various sorts and structural impediments are less obvious and perhaps more interesting, but also much
more difficult to directly measure.”
In the globalised world, country borders ought to be mere lines on the map. But recent studies
(Anderson and Van Wincoop 2001) have shown that informal trade barriers still exist and inhibit trade
flows, particularly so in the developing countries. This can arise due to a host of factors such as
complex customs procedures, which sometimes are changing, capacity constraints, given limited
facilities, and/or corruption at the border.
2.  Review of literature
To our best knowledge, there have been two other studies—Pohit and Taneja (2003), and
Subramanian and Arnold (2001)—which have attempted to identify the relevant costs in terms of time
and money, involved in trading commodities between India and Bangladesh. These studies have
attempted to identify losses of time in different stages of trade such as (a) securing export licences, (b)
procedural delays at the customs, (c) processing costs at the banks, and (d) movements of merchandise
(see Table I). However, both fall short of identifying all the factors that impinge upon trade. As Table I
shows, these two studies have not analysed separately losses of time at parking, crossing borders,
unloading at Benapole, and crossing the border while returning.

















Cost per kilometre/cost per 10 tonne
truck
No Yes Yes
Cost as proportion of annual total
exports/single shipment
Yes No Yes
Loss of time in:
Obtaining export licence Yes No Yes
Loading at Kolkata No No Yes
Transportation Yes Yes Yes
Parking No No Yes
Customs clearance Yes Yes Yes
Crossing of border No No Yes
Unloading at Benapole No No Yes
Crossing of border while returning No No Yes
Export remittances Yes No Yes
Loss perceived by exporters – cost implications:
Due to delay in customs clearance and
transportation including parking and
queue at border
No Yes Yes
Due to delay in obtaining export
remittances
No No Yes
Trading costs other than transportation
Incidence of bribes (speed money) Yes Yes Yes
Cost of credit Yes No Yes
Note: All the three studies have analysed costs in respect of the Petrapole-Benapole border.
3.  Description of border-crossing logistics
The land-border routes in West Bengal are the most important gateways for trade with
Bangladesh in terms of trade volume and value. Notable among the land customs stations in West
Bengal are Petrapole, Mahadipur, and Hilli. However, the physical infrastructure at these land customs
stations is in a mess. Table II provides a summary of the problems.
The table shows that the parking lots in all of these lack basic amenities like potable water and
toilet facilities. Approach roads to the customs stations are congested. Frequent power cuts, coupled
with low voltage, impair the work of customs officials. Surprisingly, there is no government-bonded
warehouse at these stations. Thefts are common and corruption is rampant.
Table II: Bottlenecks in physical infrastructure and procedural hazards
FACILITY      HILLI        MAHADIPUR        PETRAPOLE
Approach
Road to LCS
￿  Single lane
congested road
￿  Poor physical
condition




Parking lot ￿  No sanitation
facility and
￿  Lack of basic
amenities.
￿  No sanitation facility
and inadequate drinking4
Table II: Bottlenecks in physical infrastructure and procedural hazards
FACILITY      HILLI        MAHADIPUR        PETRAPOLE
inadequate drinking
facility.
￿  Not secured—loss
through theft





￿  Not secured—loss
through theft
￿  Prevalence of
speed money
water facility.
￿  Not secured—loss
through theft
￿  Prevalence of speed
money
Warehouse
￿  No government
bonded
warehousing
￿  No government
bonded
warehousing
￿  No government bonded
warehousing
Others ￿  Poor quality of
power















￿  Absence of bank
collection centre
￿  No office space
for clearing &
forwarding agents
￿  Irregular power supply
with low voltage
￿  Single gate for export,
import and passengers
￿  Frequent strikes delay
official work
￿  Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI)
ineffective due to lack
of efficient operator
It is evident from the above table that problems prevailing in the three land customs stations
are similar in nature. Hence, an analysis of transportation and cross-border costs and time of one of the
land customs stations would provide a fair picture of the ground realities. We have chosen the
Petrapole border for our study because it handles the highest volume of trade.
Petrapole is located about 95 km from Kolkata. The commodities traded through the Petrapole
LCS come from all over India. Kolkata is the final transhipment area for most of them, and they are
carried to the Petrapole border by truck through National Highway 35, formerly known as Jessore
Road, because the road originates in Jessore in Bangladesh. The delay on this route occurs because of
heavy traffic, because the road is narrow, and because of encroachments
1.
On average, 250 trucks travel daily along  Jessore Road. The road passes through very
congested towns like Barasat, Dutta Pukur, Ashoknagar, Habra, and Bongaon. Furthermore, hawkers in
Habra and Bongaon and three railway crossings hold up traffic. Another major hurdle is the Naobhasa
Bridge, 3 km from Petrapole. The bridge is so narrow that at a time only one truck can pass. Moreover,
heavy trucks with a carrying capacity of 15–18 tonnes, or even more, cannot pass through this bridge
because of its decrepit condition. This results in transhipments of goods in smaller trucks, either in
Kolkata or  Bongaon, incurring additional transportation cost and time.  Our findings reveal that the
average transportation cost on the Kolkata–Petrapole route is around Rs 2,543, in comparison with Rs
1,752 for other national highways, for the same distance of 95 km. Hence, the average transportation5
cost per kilometre turns out to be Rs 27 on the  Kolkata–Petrapole route, against Rs 18 for other
national highways.
The delays at the border take place at the parking lots, customs clearances, and entry/exit
points. It is mandatory for the trucks coming from  Kolkata during daytime to park at the  Bongaon
Municipality Parking, instead of moving directly towards the Central Warehousing Corporation (CWC)
parking lot, which is situated near the border gate and adjacent to the Indian Customs House. The
trucks are allowed to move serially, based on their entry coupons, towards the Petrapole border only
after 11 p.m. in the summer and after 10 p.m. in the winter
2. At the border, the trucks are again made to
park at the parking space of the CWC. After getting clearances from the Indian customs authorities,
trucks can cross the border between 10 a.m. and 5.30 p.m.
Non-transparent customs procedures and documentations at the border result in significant
costs and delays. So, exporters employ clearing agents on commission to undertake paper work at the
border. The fees of clearing agents usually vary from 0.3 per cent to 1 per cent of shipment value. In
spite of appointing clearing agents and paying bribes to customs officials, customs clearances require
much more time than is expected by the exporters. Although officially there are no fees for paper work
at the customs office, exporters are compelled to shell out money if their consignments are to be
cleared on holidays or before/after the scheduled working hours. Recently, the government of India
introduced the electronic data information (EDI) system at the customs office in Petrapole to streamline
the system. Poor planning dogs it, however. Papers are therefore cleared manually.
The entry point at the border has one gate, used for exports, imports, as well as for passenger
movements. Only one truck can pass at a time. Thus, it remains very congested. Big trees impede
traffic flow. After unloading at Benapole (in Bangladesh), trucks are allowed to enter India only after 7
p.m., or are allowed to return to India before the start of exports from India (i.e. 10 a.m.). This results in
a loss of time, apart from payments of detention charges.
4.  Framework, methodology, and sampling design
Any transaction goes with a transaction cost. A trader/exporter incurs transaction costs during
all the phases of the export process, starting from obtaining information about market conditions in any
given foreign market and ending with the receipt of final payment. One part of the transaction cost is
inherent in any transaction. It is trader-specific and depends upon his operational efficiency. The
magnitude of this transaction cost diminishes with an increase in the efficiency level of the trader. The
other part adheres to the trading environment, and occurs because of in-built inefficiencies in it. It
includes institutional bottlenecks (transport, regulatory, and other logistics) and information
asymmetry, giving rise to rent-seeking activities by officials at various steps. These cost traders time
and money, including demurrage charges, making transactions all the more expensive.
                                                                                                                                           
1 The width of Jessore road is 16 feet.
2Trucks carrying perishable items and hazardous chemicals like acid are allowed to move straight towards the border.6
In our analysis, we deal with this transaction cost and term it auxiliary transaction cost. It
refers to the additional transaction cost that exporters have to incur in terms of speed money (bribes)
and delays. As noted earlier, the cost estimates in this paper are based on primary data collated through
field surveys. We have surveyed exporters and transporters. The survey was conducted in towns
adjoining Petrapole including Kolkata, using structured questionnaires, during July and August 2002.
We solicited information from the exporters and transporters regarding the time and cost of different
phases of transactions. For clarity, the entire set of activities has been divided into three phases:
•  Phase I—loading at Kolkata, unloading at Benapole, and crossing the border while returning
•  Phase II—transportation
•  Phase III—exports including parking, customs clearances, and crossing of border.
The questionnaires elicited information on several variables. Data were collected on
transaction costs and the time taken for the transaction of each of these phases. Information was also
solicited from the traders on transportation costs, costs of credit, bribes, export remittances, duties
refunded, and in respect of obtaining the import-export code. Besides these, traders were asked to
provide the money value (opportunity cost) of delays.
Once we established the scope of the population, we obtained a sampling frame—a list of
population elements. The lists of “major transporters” (25 in all) and “major exporters” (155 in all),
with commodity specifications, were acquired from the respective federations in Kolkata. Before the
selection of samples, we held discussions with representatives from the different federations of
exporters and transporters, and learnt that the population was not heterogeneous enough, and hence
there was no reason to be critically worried about sample size and sampling error. Therefore, given the
time and budget constraints, fifteen transporters were contacted and interviewed. Though information
was solicited from 155 exporters, responses were obtained from 82.
5.  Estimation of cross-border delays
Tables III, IV, and V summarise our survey findings regarding time losses. In each table,
delay is sought to be understood by comparing the time taken with how much time should be required,
in the exporters’ view.
Table III shows that the unloading part in Benapole takes the highest time, in reality as well as
ideally—the real being more than four times the ideal. Similarly, crossing the border yields about 200
per cent real-ideal difference.








































Std. Dev 2.07 10.16 152.21 2.04 11.87 314.25 0.51 1.91 126.77
Coef. Of
var
0.83 2.48 1.20 1.11 1.32 0.71 0.32 0.41 0.42
Note: The figures in the parenthesis represent the maximum loss of time
On the other hand, Table IV shows that on average there is a loss of more than three hours in
transporting merchandise from Kolkata to Petrapole (95 km), the real being nearly 1.5 times the ideal.











Std. Dev 0.95 0.90 57.56
Coef. Of var 0.40 0.28 0.39
Note: The figure in the parenthesis represents the maximum loss of time
Table V summarises our findings regarding time losses incurred in parking, customs
clearances, and crossing the border, etc. As the table shows, the average ideal time for exports is
perceived to be slightly more than 21 hours. However, the actual is 99 hours, resulting in a loss of
around 78 hours.
Table V: Loss of time in Phase 3
Ideal Time (in
hrs)
Loss of time (in
hrs)
Loss of time as % of
ideal time
TOTAL TIME FOR EXPORTS INCLUDING





Std. Dev 5.43 17.29 125.84
Coef. Of var 0.25 0.25 0.36
Note: The figures in the parenthesis represent the maximum loss of time
In summary, the aggregate delay turns out to be around 99 hours, on average (more than four
days), for a single shipment (see Table VI). Data suggest that the aggregate delay could be as high as
192 hours (eight days).8
Table VI: Cumulative loss of time
in exports
Ideal time (hrs) Loss of time (hrs)
Phase 1 5.9 17.8
Phase 2 2.4 3.2
Phase 3 21.3 78.1
Cumulative 29.6 99.1
6.  Auxiliary transaction costs vis-à-vis shipment value
Other transaction costs incurred by Indian exporters include speed money and delays. We
have attempted to estimate the extent of these additional transaction costs in relation to the average
value of shipment based on the perceptions of our sample exporters. The results are given in Table VII.
Table VII: Auxiliary transaction cost vis-à-vis shipment value
Cost elements % of Shipment Value
Average Maximum
Delay in customs clearance including transport,











Note: Figures in the parenthesis indicate the coefficient of variation.
As this table shows, the average cost of time losses in customs clearances and transportation,
including parking and queues at the border, turns out to be 5.73 per cent of the value of shipment. The
survey results indicate that the maximum perceived loss is 18 per cent. Similarly, the financial
implications of bribes and delays in obtaining export remittances are 2.50 per cent and 2.15 per cent of
the shipment value, respectively (Table VII). The results of the survey reveal that a majority of the
exporters pay bribe, which generally varies between 1 per cent and 3 per cent of the shipment value, the
highest being 10 per cent. The maximum perceived loss due to delay in obtaining export remittances is
12 per cent of the shipment value.
Thus, it may be concluded that on average an Indian exporter incurs in sum an auxiliary
transaction cost of about 10 per cent of the shipment value.
7.  Summary and policy implications
Our estimates show that the delay in a single shipment from India to Bangladesh is to the tune
of four days (99 hours). The maximum loss of time occurs in parking, customs clearances, and crossing
the border (78 hours), followed by unloading at Benapole (nine hours). Our analysis also shows that on
average an Indian exporter incurs an auxiliary transaction cost of about 10 per cent of shipment value.9
One aspect usually not taken into account while undertaking trade liberalisation—either
unilaterally or through free trade agreements (FTAs)—is the welfare implications of institutional
barriers. In low-income and transitional economies like India and Bangladesh, the real barrier to trade
is quite often institutional, taking the form of unreasonable customs delays and bribes. However, the
literature on trade liberalisation or costs and benefits of FTAs has rarely touched on this issue. How
such delays arise and their duration have been badly documented, but  their impact on trade is
undeniable.
The crucial question is whether the institutional factors can marginalise or negate the India’s
gains from trade liberalisation, either through the unilateral route or the FTA route. Sadly, none of the
past Indian studies quantifying the gains from FTAs or trade liberalisation has accounted these factors.
In fact, similar studies for other countries are also silent on this, the sole exception being the study for
Russia by Edgar  Cudmore and John Whalley (2003), which has shown that liberalisation can be
welfare-worsening rather than welfare-improving, as is usually the case in conventional models if one
incorporates border delays in the analysis. In the context of India-Bangladesh trade, this finding has
immense relevance in emphasising the need to have a fresh look in improving the infrastructure in the
land customs stations. The approach roads towards the land customs stations have to be widened.
Government-bonded warehousing facility is mandatory. Efforts should be made to operationalise the
EDI system immediately. The local administration, with co-operation from exporters, should ensure
potable water and sanitation facilities at the parking lots. In addition, issues related to poor power
supply and strikes should be sorted out.
Negotiations are on for signing an FTA with Bangladesh. But the government of India needs
to focus more on administration, infrastructure development, and border delays. Moreover, the balance
of trade is significantly in favour of India. As a consequence, the trucks from Bangladesh carrying
Indian imports have to give way to the Indian trucks carrying Indian exports, and the waiting time on
average turns out to be 4–5 hours.
3 Once the trucks from Bangladesh enter India, immediate
transhipments of Indian imports are required because there is no customs bonded warehousing facility
in Petrapole, and the Bangladeshi trucks are not allowed to move further into the Indian territory.
Perishable commodities are sometimes damaged, especially so during the monsoon. Currently, the
Indian imports are transhipped in a vacant land beside the Indian customs office, which is insufficient.
Bangladeshi traders complain that Indian customs officials misbehave with them, in spite of
regular suborning. As this generally happens on the land route, they prefer the air route, which adds to
their costs.
The government of India should construct separate gates for exports and imports in all the
important land customs stations in general and Petrapole in particular. If this is not feasible, during
some days of the week imports from Bangladesh should be given the first preference before exports
from India proceed. Transhipments of goods from Bangladeshi trucks to Indian trucks have to be made
efficient and trader-friendly.
                                                
3 . This is true with other LCSs.10
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